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RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NoTES-INDORSEMENT-GUARANTEE INDORSED ON NOTE-The
words, "For value received I hereby guarantee payment of the within note
and waive demand and notice of protest on same when due," were written
on the back of a promissory note and signed by the payee. Held: These
words constitute a mere guarantee of payment, and not an indorsement in
due course. Ireland v. Floyd, 142 Pac. Rep. 4o (Okl. 1914).
The authorities are in conflict as to the effect of a guarantee written
on the back of a negotiable instrument by the holder. A majority of the
decisions are in harmony with the rule followed by the court in the principal
case. Taylor v. Binney, 7 Mass. 479 (81) ; Snevily v. Ekel, i NV. & S. 2o3
(Pa. 184); Central Trust Co. v. First National Bank, Iox U. S. 68 (i879).
Consistently with this doctrine, a guarantee on the back of a note does mot
impose the broad mercantile responsibility of an indorsement. Belcher v.
Smith, 61 Mass. 482 (181), and gives to one claiming under it, as against
parties antecedent to the guarantor, merely the rights of an assignee of an
ordinary chose in action. Tuttle v. Bartholomew, 53 Mass. 452 (1847);
Miller v. Gaston, 2 Hill, 188 (N. Y. 1842). Contra to the doctrine of the
principal case, it has been held in a number of jurisdictions that a guarantee
of payment indorsed on a negotiable instrument is equivalent to an indorse-
ment, as understood by the law merchant. Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 499
(1848) ; Savings Bank v. Hanna, 124 Iowa, 374 (904).
The Negotiable Instruments Law does not provide in express terms for
the case of a guarantee indorsement. See N. I. L §63. A Michigan statute
explicitly declares that a guarantee of payment is to be regarded as an
indorsement in due course. Compiled Laws of Michigan, Vol. II, §4879;
Green v. Burrows, 47 Mich. 70 (188i).
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW-DEPIvAON OF LiBERTY-A State statute prohib-
ited the carrying in parades of any red or black flag bearing any inscription
opposed to organized government, or which is sacrilegious, or which may be
derogatory to public morals. It was claimed that this statute was a depriva-
tion of liberty without due process of law. Held: The statute was a valid-
exercise of the police power. Commonwealth v. Karvonen, io6 N. E. Rep,
556 (Mass. 1914).
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was not designed to
interfere with the police power of the State, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.
27 (1884). Under certain conditions both the liberty and property of the
individual may be subjected to an exercise of that power. Commonwealth v.
Straus, i9i Mass. 545 (i9o6). The scope of the power is confined to the
enactment of laws designed for the protection of the public safety, morals,
health and welfare. Chicago, etc., R. R., v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 (x9ro);
Commonwealth v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356 (i914). And is further limited to
conditions reasonably requiring its exercise. Mutual Loan Company v. Mar-
tell, 222 U. S. 225 (1911); Commonwealth v. Riley, 232 U. S. 671 (1913);
Mehlos v. City of Milwaukee" i56 Wis. 591 (1914). It is the settled policy
of the courts to regard the legislature as the judge in the first instance of the
conditions requiring an enactment, and to declare a statute unconstitutional
only when the opinion of the legislature is plainly and palpably unreasonable.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (i887).
Statutes designed to promote maintenance of order cannot be stricken
down as unconstitutional unless they manifestly have no tendency to produce
that result. Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242 (i9o3); Chicago
Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 68o (1913). It would seem that tie
statute in the principal case cannot fairly be said to interfere unreasonably
with the liberty of the citizens, nor can it be adjudged to nave no rational
connection with the preservation of public safety.
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CONTRACTs -CoMrROMISE OF DISPUTED CLAIm-A debtor tendered, in full
settlement of a disputed claim, an amount less than that which the creditor
claimed to be due. The creditor accepted. In an action for the balance it
was held that the dispute was sufficient consideration to uphold the settle-
ment. Hileman v. Maxwell, 149 N. W. Rep. 44 (Neb. 1914).
The doctrine of Foakes v. Beer, L. R. 9 App. Cases, 6o5 (Eng. 1884),
that the payment of a lesser sum is no consideration for the relinquishment
of a larger claim, is inapplicable where the larger claim is unliquidated, Wil-
kinson v. Byers, i-A. & E. io6 (Eng. j834); doubtful, Rosenthal v. Budwick,
78 N. Y. Supp. 415 (19o2); or disputed, Bingham v. Browning, 97 11. App.
442 (9o0). But the -debtor's dispute as to the amount due must be made in
good faith, Lumber Co. v. Brown, 68 Vt. 239 (1896). The mere fact that
a contract for payment of money is in writing does not make the claim
liquidated so as to render inoperative a settlement of the claim for a lesser
amount. Bingham v. Browning, supra. Though an agreement to accept in
full settlement a sum less than the amount claimed by one party and admitted
to be due by the other is void for want of a sufficient consideration to sup-
port if. Raven v. Ins. Co., io6 N. W. Rep. ig8 (Iowa, i9o6), yet an agree-
ment between a judgment creditor and an insolvent judgment debtor con-
templating resorting to voluntary bankruptcy whereby the creditor is to take
an amount less than the judgment as full satisfaction, is supported by a
sufficient consideration. Haubers v. McCann, 76 Pac. Rep. 983 (Colo. 19o4).
Prevention of a suit is a sufficient consideration for a compromise of ;
disputed claim, Battle v. McArthur, 49 Fed. Rep. 75 (1892), as is forbear-
ance to prosecute proceedings for the -reversal of a judgment obtained by a
creditor. Gering v. School Dist., 1o7 N. W. Rep. 250 (Neb. x906). Pay-
ment of a sum less than the whole amount, where the whole of the debt is
not yet due is a sufficient consideration for the release of the whole debt.
Russell v. Stevenson, 75 Pac. Rep. 627 (Wash. 194). The acceptance by a
creditor of a sum less than the amount of his claim will not operate as an
accord and satisfaction, unless it is made known to the creditor that the
money was tendered in full settlement of the entire claim. Harrison v. Hen-
derson, 67 Kan. 194 (i9o3).
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-PROMIsE TO ANSWER FOR THE DEBT OF
ANOTHER-One who had sold, but not yet shipped, a quantity of potatoes to a
person who had a contract to furnish potatoes to a seed company, telephoned
the company that, as he. had heard reports of the vendee's doubtful financial
standing, he would not ship the potatoes unless the company would agree to
pay for them. An agent of the company replied that the company would pay
if the vendee did not. The vendor thereupon shipped the potatoes directly
to the company, and afterwards sued the latter upon the oral promise of its
agent.. Held: The promise was not within the Statute of Frauds, and need
not be in writing, because the main purpose of the promisor was to secure
a benefit to himself, and he did in fact secure such benefit. Colbath v. Clark
Seed Co., 91 Ad. Rep. ioo7 (Me. 1914).
The clause of the Statute of Frauds which requires a promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another to be in writing in order
to render the promisor liable, has given rise to many conflicting decisions.
Certain general rules, however, may be deduced. It is settled, except perhaps
in Pennsylvania, that a promise to the debtor himself to pay his debt is not
within the statute because it is not a promise to answer for the debt of
"another"; the promise must be to the creditor. Eastwood v. Kenyon, ii A.
& E. 438 (Eng. 184o); Gill v. Ferrin, 71 N. H. 421 (i9o2). For the state of
the law in Pennsylvania, see Fehlinger v. Wood, r34 Pa. 517 (i8o) ; Sharp
v. Levan, 236 Pa. .374 (1912). The promise being to the creditor, the general
rule is well recognized that a collateral; not an original, promise is within
the statute. Brown v. Reinberger, 177 IlL App. 297 (1913); Enterprise Co.
v. Bank, 167 S. W. 296 (Tex. -1914). The difficulty, however, is to determine
what constitutes the one or the other. The intention of the parties at the time
of making the promise mtist of course be regarded. Millsaps v. Nixon, xo2
Ark. 435 (1912). In the principal case, the intention at least of the promisor,
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judging from the form of his promise, was to pay only if the debtor himself
did not. But the form of words is not conclusive; as said in Davis v.
Patrick, 141 U. S. 479 (1891), "The real character of a promise does not
depend altogether upon the form of expression, but largely on the situation
of the parties." There is no universal test to ascertain the character of the
promise. One view is that the promise is not within the statute when it is
based on a new consideration which is of pecuniary benefit to the promisor.
Durgin v. Smith, 715 Mich. 239 (1897); Munroe v. Mundy, 141 N. W. Big
(Ia. 1914). Other cases applying the new corlsideration test make no dis-
tinction whether it is a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the prom-
isee. Gainsville v. Hobbs, 153 N. C. 188 (igio); Windsor v. Ruland, x48
N. Y. S. 386 (1914). A third view, held by only a minority, is that if the
promise of the third person discharges the liability of the debtor, the promise
is original and not within the statute; but if the debtor's liability continues,
the promise is collateral and must be in writing. Manheim v. Jones, 63 W.
Va. 373 (i9o8). The principal case follows the so-called "main purpose" rule,
laid down by the leading case of Emerson v. Slater, 22 How. 28 (U. S.
1859): when the leading object of the promisor is to subserve some interest
of his own, notwithstanding the effect is to pay or discharge the debt of
another, his promise is not within the statute.
CRIMINAL LAw-DEFENSF.S-INSANTY-In a prosecution for murder, an
instruction that if the jury found that the defendant had the mental disorder
called "constitutional inferiority" and that such disorder carried with it a
diminished degree of responsibility for the act, he could not be found guilty
of murder in the first degree, was properly refused. Coin. v. Cooper, io6 N.
E. Rep. 545 (Mass. 19r4).
The courts are clearly in conflict upon the question of the degree of in-
sanity which is sufficient to excuse the commission of a crime. The Eiglish
view, which is supported by a bare majority of American jurisdictions, is
that the sole test of responsibility, when insanity is offered as a defense, is
whether the accused could distinguish between right and wrong as to the
particular act at the time it was committed. McNaghten's Case, io Clark
& F. 200 (1843); Oborn v. State, 126 N. W. Rep. 737 (Wis. igio). The other
jurisdictions follow the English rule as far as it goes, and also take the
further position that the accused is excused if he is impelled to do the act
by an irresistible impulse, which is produced by some mental disease and
affects the will, so that the person afflicted, while recognizing the wrongful-
ness of his act, yet cannot resist the impulse to do it. Parsons v. State, 8i
Ala. 5'7 (x886); Taylor v. Com., io9 Pa. 262 (1885). Where the accused is
laboring under an insane delusion, and hence is only partially insane, his
act will be excused if the delusion and the act are connected in the relation
of cause and effect and if he would have been excused had the facts been
really as he supposed they were. Com. v. Rogers, 7 Mete. SOO (Mass. 1844).
Mere weakness of the mind or deficiency in will power is not sufficient
to excuse the act. State v. Flowers, 58 Kan. 702 (1897). Nor does it seem
that there should be various degrees of insanity, which will allow conviction
of a smaller crime, but not of a larger one. So there is no degree of in-
sanity sufficient to acquit of murder but not sufficient to acquit of man-
slaughter. U. S. v. Lee, 4 Mackey, 489 (D. C. i886). However, it has
been held that even where there was not a total want of responsibility,
the prisoner's mind might be so impaired by disease or moral insanity
that he would be incapable of a deliberate, premeditated murder, and so
could not be convicted of murder in the first degree, but should be guilty
of murder in the second degree. Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514 (1876).
It does not appear in the principal case what "constitutional inferiority" is,
but if it is merely a diminished degree of responsibility, then the principal
case and Anderson v. State, supra, are flatly contra.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-MIscONDUCT OF COURT-ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE-
The defendant, who had been found guilty of first degree murder; sought a
new trial on the ground that trial judge showed hostility to the defendant's
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couTisel. Itcr.alia,.tlxe judge, without waiting for an objection to be inter-
posed or an answer given'Io a question asked a witness by the defendant's
attorney, said: "Re has aiiswered that . . . I will sustain an objection
and make it myself. We have got to get through here some time." Held:
"While the court might have expressed its rulings in a manner indicative of
less impatience and.less calculated to affect the sensibilities of counsel, it
cannot be said . :. that- this alone was sufficient to prejudice the rights
of the defendaut-." People v. Svendsen, 142 Pac. Rep. 861 (Cal. 1914).
It is not improper for the court to 'caution, correct, admonish or even
iebuke counsel, during trial, provided that a fair trial is not thereby prevented.
Coin. v. Coughlin, 182 Mass. 5s8 (igo3); State v. Brown, ioo N. C. 519
(1888); Dailey v. State, 55 S. W. Rep. 821 (Tex. Cr. App. igoo). Comment
by a judge upon the great amount of time being needlessly consumed by
counsel is not ground for a new trial. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293 (1852);
State v. Veillon, Io5 La. 411 (igoo) ; State v. Duestrow, 137 MO. 44 (1897).
Unnecessary manifestation of impatience and reflection on' the conduct of
counsel is not a reversible error, where the verdict is responsive to the evi-
dence. Tuttle v. State, 83 Ark. 37-9 (1907). Directing counsel to desist from
an examination leading merely to a repetition of former answers is not a
prejudicial error, notwithstanding that counsel is thereby placed in a ridiculous
position before the jury. State v. Brown, ioo Ia. 5o (1,896). "I do not think
that is a proper examination" is not an improper remark where the questions
asked are trivial and could elicit nothing of consequence. Lewis v. State, go
Ga. 95 (i892).
A severe criticism of the methods of an attorney trying a case is ground
for reversal. Peeples v. State, 1o3 Ga. 629 (1898). 'Thus, "Don't lead the
witness . . . these ignorant witnesses can be led to say anything in the
world you want them to say" is an. improper remark. Jefferson v. State, 8o
Ga. 16 (i887). Renarks tending to give jury the impression that counsel is
asking foolish questions, when in fact they are material are prejudicial and
ground for new trial. Nave v. McGrane, i9 Idaho, iii (19o). A hostile
attitude toward counsel during the trial is alone sufficient for reversal. People
v. Mayer, 132 N. Y. App. Div. 646 (igog). A remark made by a judge in
overruling an objection to evidence which tends to ridicule counsel constitutes
error per se. State ,. Clements, 15 Ore. 237 (1887) ; contra, State v. Teeter,
239 Mo. 475 (igii), in which case, the trial judge stated that counsel was
competent only to practice before a juistice of the peace.
DECEIr-FaAu--INvEsTIGATION oF FAcTs-REPoRiT-An agent, after a
period afforded for investigation, reported that a contract was good security,
when he had not investigated and had no knowledge concerning it. Held: The
misstatement was not a mere matter of opinion, but of a fact of which he
assumed to have knowledge, and his want of actual knowledge of its falsity
is no defense. Scribner v. Palmer, x42 Pac. Rep. 1167 (Wash. 1914).
There is great confusion in the law as regards the defendant's want of
belief in the truth of the fact asserted in an action of. fraud and deceit. The
English rule is that there is no liability unless the itatement was made with
knowledge of its falsity. An honest belief is a defense, whether a reasonable
belief or not. Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cases, 337 (Eng. i88g). Some
American jurisdictions uphold a conviction where the statement is made under
an honest belief but for which there are no reasonable grounds. Scholfield
Pulley Co. v. Scholfield, 71 Conn. 1 (1898). Others follow England and
regard the "reasonable grounds test" as merely evidence to determine whether
there was an honest belief. Dilworth v. Bradner, 85 Pa. 238 (1877) ; Wimple
v. Patterson, 117 S. W. Rep. io34 (Texas, igog); Kountz v. Kennedy, 147
N. Y. 124 (1895). Some courts draw the line at whether the defendant has
benefited by the false representations. Haltomb v. Noble, 69 Mich. 396
(1888). Still others allow an action of deceit only upon actual knowledge
of the falsity, but an action on the case for negligence where there are no
reasonable grounds for belief. Cunningham v. Furnishing Co., 74 N. H. 4
(x908).
. 7.'
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Statements of opinion as a general rule are not actionable, Lynch v.
Murphy. 17T Mass. 307 (i88) ; Dalrymple V. Craig, 139 Mich. 211 (195), but
where the facts are not equally well known and the statement als& amounts
to one of fact, an action will lie. Smith v. Land and House Corporation,
L R. 28 Ch. Div. 14 (Eng. 1884). So also where one makes a statement as
though from personal knowledge and where it is implied that he has ascer-
tained the truth of what he says, all jurisdictions uphold an action if the
statement is untrue, even though the defendant had an honest belief in its
verity. Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403 (1888); McDonald
v. Smith, 1o2 N. W. Rep. 668 (Mich. 19O5) ; Stearns v. Kennedy, 94 Minn.
439 (go5) ; contra, Page v. Bent, 43 Mass. 371 (184T). So also all jurisdic-
tions, including England, hold that one is liable for "reckless statements,"
where the defendant states as a fact something of which he knows nothing.
Hadcock v. Osmer, 153 N. Y. 604 (1897). Whether a representation is to
he taken as an assertion of personal knowledge or as a strong expression
of opinion depends on the nature of the subject matter and the relation of
the defendant to it. Shelton v. Healy, 74 Conn. 265 (19oo); Cawley v.
Smyth, 46 N. J. L 380 (1884); Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241 (1899). The
modern tendency, especially in the West, is to hold the maker of false repre-
sentations to a stricter account. Grant . Huschke, 74 Wash. 257 (r913).
DECEIT-FRA UD--RELANCE ON FALSE REPra.SFNTAoN-Plaintiff seeks
damages for fraud and deceit perpetrated upon him in the purchase of a
panorama. Alleged misrepresentations were that the panorama's earning
capacity was $20 per day. Before buying the machine, the plaintiff exhibited
the panorama and the receipts were but $12.50 per day. Held: That if the
plaintiff availed himself of the opportunity to test the truth of the represen-
tations made and discovers prior to the consummation of the contract that
such representations were false, he will not be heard to say that he was
deceived by them. Gratz v. Schuler, x42 Pac. Rep. 899 (Cal. 1914).
Many cases, particularly the early ones, lay down the broad doctrine that,
if the defrauded party has the means of knowledge at hand, he has not
been deceived by the defendant's misrepresentations because, as a prudent
man, he must be deemed to have availed himself of such means. Shepard v.
Goben, x42 Ind. 318 (1895) ; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364 (187z). But one
is not prevented from recovering because he did not make inquiry concerning
the matter, if inquiry was prevented by the other party's artifice. McMillen
v. Hillman, xi8 Pac. Rep. 903 (Wash. 1911). The more recent cases, in
accordance with the principal case, tend to hold that there is no conclusion
of law that the plaintiff did avail himself of such means of knowledge or that
it was his duty to do so, and, consequently, he may still show that he was
misled by the defendant's misrepresentations. Bigelow on Torts (8th ed.),
p. 92; King v. Livingston Manufacturing Co., 6o So. Rep. 143 (Ala. 1912);
Yanelli v. Littlejohn, 137 N. W. Rep. 723 (Mich. 19r2). And the doctrine
of the recent cases is specially applicable when there is active, positive fraud.
Linington v. Strong. 1o7 I11. 295 (1883). However, if the party defrauded
institutes inquiry for himself and ascertains the truth, he cannot rely upon
the falsity of such representations. West End Real Estate Co. v. Claiborne,
97 Va. 734 (goo).
EvmENcr,-ApsIsSIoNs-SILENcE-The defendant was confined in" prison
with his wife, who had been convicted of murder, to be tried for the same
offence. At his trial, fellow-prisoners were permitted to testify that they
had heard the wife charge him with having compelled her to kill the de-
ceased, and that the defendant had not denied it. Held: This evidence is not
admissible as an admission of the defendant's guilt. Riley v. State, 65 So.
Rep. 882 (Miss. 1914).
The court in this case put their decision on the ground that because
of the relationship existing between them, a husband is not called upon to
deny the statement of his wife. In State v. Landisi, go Ati. Rep. zo98 (N. J.
1914), however, it was held that the fact that the charge was made by the
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defendant's wife did not relieve him of the necessity of denying it. The
general rule governing admissions implied by silence, is that any statements
made in the prcsence of the accused under circumstances th'at call for a
denial if not denied by him, are admissible against him. Com. v. O'Brien,
179" Mass. 533 (igoi). The accused must hear and fully comprehend the
charge. People v. Conrow, 2oo N. Y. 356 (191i); and must have been in
a position to cxplain. Hanger v. United States, 173 Fed. Rep. 54 (1o9).
1he qu.stion as to whether or not the defendant has heard it is for the -jury.
Com. v.. Detweiler. 2--9 Pa. 304 (1910). When the accused is under arrest
or in custody at the time the statement is made, authorities are not agreed
as to whether e-idence of his silence when charged is admissible. Some
courts, following the Massachusetts rule, exclude the statement invariably.
Coin. v. Kenney, 12 Metc. 235 '(Mass. 1847) ; Vaughan v. State, 42 L. R. A.
889 (Okla. i9ri); but the better rule allows some flexibility according to
circumstances. Com. v. Aston, 227 Pa. 112 (igio) ; State v. Booker, 68 IV. Va.
8 (igio). See also: Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. II, §io72. In any case
accused is at liberty to explain his silence. People v. Byrne, i6o Cal. 217
(i911). This rule is applicable in both civil and criminal cases. Kelley v.
People, 55 N. Y. 565 (1874) ; but does not apply to silence at a judicial pro-
ceeding. People v. Willett, 92 N. Y. 29 (1883). See also: Jones on Evi-
dence (2nd ed.), §290. Whether or not the circumstances are such as will
give rise to an implied admission is a question for the court. People v.
Byrne, supra. Such evidence should be received with caution and not unless
clearly within the rule. People v. Conrow, supra. The weight of such evi-
dence is for the jury. State v. Booker, supra.
EVIENCE-DYI G DECLARATmoNs-ADMISSIBILITY-Deceased had been
mortally wounded by the accused. After saying that he wished to make
a statement because he thought that he was dying, he charged the accused
with the crime. Held: The evidence was properly admitted. Hawkins v.
State, 142 Pac. Rep. 1093 (Okla. 1914).
The admission of dying declarations is an exception to the rule exclud-
ing hearsay and is founded upon the assumption that the consciousness of
impending death is as potent an incentive for speaking the truth as the
sanctity of an oath. Ashton's Case, 2 Lew. Co. C. 147 (Eng. i83"); Tracy v.
People, 97 Ill. ioi (i8go). The admission of such declarations is practically
everywhere confined to cases of homicide. Thayer v. Lombard, x65 Mass.
i74 (1896) ; but a recent case in Kansas, rejecting this limitation, admitted
such declarations in a civil case, holding that the probability of truth, which
was the reason for admitting them at all, was equally present in both cases.
Thurston v. Fritz, So L R. A. 1167 (Kan. 1914). Although not followed,
in theory this view has some support. 2 Wigmore on Evidence, §x436. As
emphasized in the principal case, consciousness of impending death is abso-
lutely esseniial in such cases. The general rule is that the declarant must
believe that death is certain and may not entertain even a slight hope of
recovery at the time. Peak v. State, 5o N. J. L, 222 (x888) ; Com. v. Roberts,
io8 Mass. 296 (1871). There seems, however, to be a modern tendency to
hold that the mere realization of the possibility of a miraculous recovery does
not disqualify the declaration. Peoples v. Com., 87 Ky. 487 (1888). It is
generally held that the declarant's apprehension of death may be inferred from
the seriousness of his condition coupled with statements on the part of
declarant to that effect. Com. v. Abel, 91 Atl. 252 (Pa. 1914); and accord-
ing to the better rule it can be inferred from the nature of the wound alone,
without any such statement. Woodcock's Case, x Leach.Cr. Cas. Soo (Eng.
1789);- Kilpatrick v. Com., 3r Pa. x98 (1858), but in Reg. v. Morgan, x4
Cox Cr., 331 (Eng. i875), it was held that no such inference of conscious-
ness of approaching death could be inferred from the nature of the wound
alone. Certain acts such as sending for a priest or spiritual adviser, People
v. Buettner, 233 Ill. 272 (19o8); sending for one's children, Rice v. State,
94 S. W. Rep. IO24 (Tex. 19o6), have been held sufficient evidence of knowl-
edge of impending death, and arranging business matters is a strong circum-
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stance indicating such consciousness. People v. Shehadey, 12 Cal. App. 648
(19o). But it has also been held that sending for a doctor by declarant 1s
not an indication of hope. State v. Bordelow, 113 La. io9 (zgo4). The
question as to whether or not declarant is in proper state of mind to make
his declaration admissible is for the court. Kehoe v. Com., 85 Pa. i27 (1877).
EVIDENCE-PRSUMPTION OF DEATH FROm ABSEcE-If a person is con-
tinuously absent from home for a period of seven years or more, and is
not heard from within that time by those who, if he were alive, would be
likely to hear from him, a presumption arises that he is dead, and that he
died during the first seven years of such absence, but not that his death
occurred at any particular time during that period. McLaughlin v. Sovereign
Camp, IV. 0. W., 149 N. NV. Rep. 112 (Neb. 1914).
The presumption of death arising from the absence of a person for'
seven years without being heard from, has been for a long time firmly estab-
lished. Doe v. Jesson, 6 Eait, 84 (Eng. i8o5); Loring v. Steineman, i Mete.
2o4 (Mass. 184o) ; Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. i5o (Pa. 1838). The-presumption
had its origin in the Statute of I James I, c. xi, relating to prosecutions for
bigamy. That statute excepted from its provisions married persons who
should re-marry after the continued absence of the former husband or wife
for seven years without being known to the other party to have been living
within that time. By what was really judicial legislation, the courts derived
from this statute the present presumption of death from seven years' absence,
and applied it not merely to bigamy cases, but universally. Some states have
passed statutes on the subject, defining or limiting the presumption. Sover-
eign Camp, NV. 0. W., v. Ruedrich, i58 S. W. i7o (Tex. 19r3); Bradley v.
Modern Woodmen, 124 S. W. 69 (Mo. i9io). The presumption is not con-
clusive, but may be rebutted. Thus, absence for seven years will not raise
a presumption of death if the absentee is a fugitive from justice. Mutual,
etc., Ins. Co. v. Martin, io8 Ky. ir (i9oo); Winter v. Supreme Lodge, 6•
Mo. App. 1 (1902). On the other hand, the presumption may arise, under
certain circumstances, from an absence of less than seven years. For ex-
ample, in Cox v. Ellsworth, 18 Neb. 66A (1886), evidence of character, habits,
domestic relations, and the-like, making the abandonment of home and family
improbable, and showing a want of all those motives which can be supposed
to influence men to such acts, was held sufficient to raise a presumption of
death though the supposed decedent had disappeared only five years before
the suit.
By the great weight of authority, the presumption is confined to the fact
of death, and does not extend to the time thereof. The time of the death is
entirely a matter of evidence, and, if material, must be affirmatively proved
by the party alleging it. Spahr v. Ins. Co., 98 Minn. 471 (igo6); Security
Bank v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 112 Va. 462 (i9i). New York and
Illinois, however, hold that the death will be presumed to have occurred at
the end of the seven year period. Matter of Davenport, 75 N. Y. S. 934
(1902); Dickinson v. Donovan, x6o Ill. App. 195 (1912). The computation
of the seven year period begins from the time the person was last heard
from or known to be alive. Smith v. Combs, 49 N. J. Eq. 42o (i892); Mor-
row v. McMahon, 71" N. Y. S. 961 (i90t).
EVIDENCE-PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT Acrs-The defendant was indicted for
statutory rape. Held: Evidence of similar subsequent acts of intercourse be-
tween the parties was admissible. People v. Thompson, io6 .N. E. Rep. 78
(N. Y. 1914).
The doctrine is now well, if not universally, established that in prose-
cutions for adultery, seduction, statutory rape upon one under the age of
consent, and incest, acts of sexual intercourse between the parties prior to
the offense charged in the indictment may be given in evidence. Bass v.
State, 103 Ga. 227 (1897); Boyd v. State, 81 Ohio, 239 (io9); State v.
Schneller, i2o Minn. 25 (1913). The evidence in such cases is introduced to
prove the defendant guilty of committing the act charged. People v. Koller,
142 Cal. 621 09o4); People v. Gray, 251 I11. 431 (igii). Its admission is
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based on the theory that it shows a disposition on the part of the defendant
to commit such acts with the prosecutrix and hence that he is likely to in-
dulge his passion whenever the opportunity is presented. State v. Briggs,
68 Ia. 416 (1886); People v. Edwards, 73 Pac. Rep. 416 (Cal. i9o3). Un-
doubtedly, the difficulty of proving these charges because the prosecutrix is
generally the sole witness has induced the courts to be more ready to accept
the evidence. State v. Snover, 64 N. J. L. 65 (1899).
The authorities are not in harmony upon the further question whether
acts subsequent to the date relied upon for conviction are admissible. The
evidence is held admissible by several courts. Thayer v. Thayer, xox 'Mass.
113 (1869); Crane v. People, 65 Ill. App. 492 (1896); People v. Carter, 133
Cal. i1 (19oi); State v. Sebastian, 8r Conn. I (19o8). The majority of
courts, however, though admitting evidence of prior acts, exclude evidence
of those occurring subsequent to the date charged in the indictment. People
v. Fowler, io4 Mich. 449 (1895); Wiggins v. State, 84 S. W. Rep. 821 (Tex.
Cr. App. 19o5). Since the true ground of admission is that it shows a pas-
sion for this woman it should be immaterial whether this feeling was proved
by previous or subsequent acts. King v. Iowa, 117 Ia. 484 (19o2); Wood-
ruff v. State, 72 Neb. 8is (19o4).
LIBEL-REMEnY IN EQuIY--A bill in equity will not lie to enjoin the
publication of a libel; the proper remedy is an action at law for damages.
Finish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. Riavaaja Pub. Co., io6 N. E. Rep.
561 (Mass. 1914).
It is well settled in America that neither a final nor an interlocutory
injunction will be granted to restrain libel on slander of iitle or reputa-
tion. The courts of equity in England also refused to exercise this power
before legislation changed the rule. Singer Co. v. Domestic Co., 49 Gia. 73
(1873); Prudential Ass. Co. v. Knott, io Ch. App. x42 (1874); Kidd v. Horry,
28 Fed. Rep. 773 (1886). The reason-for the rule in America is sometimes
said to be that the granting of such an injunction would be repugnant to
Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution, which declares that every citizen may
freely speak and write his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
an abuse of that right; and that no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge
the liberty of speech or of the press. Guardian Soc. v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly,
ioi (N. Y. 1877); Life Assoc. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173 (1876). Injunc-
tions to restrain libel have been granted in a few cases of alleged conflicting
patents, where statements were made by one patentee concerning the busi-
ness or right to the patent of the other party and where these statements
were found to be lib-lous. The publication must be malicious as well as
false and must be more than a mere statement that the plaintiff has no right
to make and sell the article in question. Celluloid Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear
Dental Co., 13 Blatchf. 375 (U. S. 1876); Craft v. Richardson, 59 How.
Pr. 356 (N. Y. i88o).
In England, the power to grant such injunctions has been given by the
Common Law Procedure Act of x854 and the Judicature Act of 1873. The
former gave the common law courts, when an action for damages had been
instituted, the right to issue injunctions on such terms as appeared "reason-
able and just" The Judicature Act vested the jurisdiction of the common
'law courts and the Court of Chancery to issue injunctions to restrain tort
in one court, and provided that an interlocutory injunction could be granted
whenever just and convenient. The power to issue a final injunction after
the writing has been ascertained to be libellous is admitted beyond question
and is freely exercised. Thorley's Food Co. v. Massam, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 763
(,88o); Monson v. Tussands, L. R. i Q. B. 671 (1894). Nor is the power
of th, courts under the Judicature Act to grant an interlocutory injunction
to restrain libel in any doubt, but the right has been very rarely exercised.
To 6btain such an injunction, it must be shown that the alleged libel was
untrue, malicious, and injurious to the plaintiff's business, that it was sure
to be repeated and that it war not privileged. Quartz Hill Mining Co. v.
Beall, L, R. 2o Ch. D. 5o (1882); Bonnard v. Perryman; 2 Ch. 269 (i8gi).
There are no statutes in America which grant this power.
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MALICIOUS PROSECttToz-ELEENTs-After the defendant's criminal
charge against the plaintiff had been dismissed by a magistrate, the defend-
ant appeared before a grand jury and sought to have the plaintiff indicted.
Held: Assuming that the defendant's appearance. before the grand jury is not
of itself ground for an action for malicious prosecution, the jury may con-
sider it in determining whether the original and actional arrest was malicious.
Hart v. Leitch, 9I Atl. Rep. 782 (Md. 1914).
In. civil cases there is a conflict as to what proceedings on the part of
the defendant will furnish ground for an action for malicious prosecution.
The more modern view, which probably represents the preponderance of
authority, is that the action may be maintained for the prosecution, without
probable cause, of any civil suit which terminates in favor of the plaintiff,
the reason given being that the plaintiff has been wronged thereby and is
entitled to redress. Allen v. Codman, 139 Mass. z36 (1885); O'Neill v.
Johnson, 53 Minn. 439 (1893). See also: Cooley on Torts (3rd ed.), Vol..I,
P. 349. A inumber of states, on the other hand, hold that no action will lie
for civil prosecutions unless there is seizure of the person or property of
the plaintiff. Meyer v. Walter, 64 Pa. 283 (187o); Smith v. Mich. Buggy
Co., 175 II1. 61g (1898); Paul v. Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9 (N. Y. 19o3). The
reason for this view given in Meyer v. W¥alter, supra, is that if plaintiff's
person and property are not interfered with, he has not been damaged, and
defendant is sufficiently punished by payment of costs. Some writers con-
sider this the better view. See Newell on Malicious Prosecution, §xo, also
30 Am. Law Reg. 281.
In criminal cases there is a wide diversity of opinion as to what pro-
ceedings constitute a prosecution. Probably the prevailing rule is that laid
down in Haywood v. Cuthbert, 4 McCord, 354 (S. C. 1827). There, in
holding that an information before a magistrate upon which no process issued
was not an actionable prosecution, the court said: "A correct criterion by
which to determine whether a prosecution has or has not been commenced
will best be formed by inquiring whether the proceedings are in such a
situation as to put it in the power of the party prosecuted to compel the state
to proceed, or to procure his own discharge, which can never happen until
he is a party to .them." Consistently with this rule it is held that no action
will be for procuring a warrant where it remains unserved, Mitchell v.
Donanski, 9 L. R. A. 171 (R. I. i9o6), Cooper v. Amour, 42 Fed. 215 (Ixpo);
nor for an arrest by a policeman without a warrant at the defendant's request.
Barry v. Third Ave. Ry., 5I App. Div. 385 (N. Y. i9oo) ; but it has been held,
contrary to this rule, that a charge orally made before a magistrate is suffi-
cient prosecution though there be no summons nor warrant. Dawson v.
Vansandan, ii IV. R. 516 (Eng. 1863). The following have likewise been
held to constitute a prosecution: the filing of an affidavit, Coffey v. Myers,
84 Ind. io5 (1882) ; issuance of a criminal warrant, though it is not placed
in hands of an officer, Holmes v. Johnson, 44 N. C. 44 (1852); holding and
committing accused for grand jury, though he is later discharged by failure
to indict. Graves v. Dawson, 130 Mass. 78 (i88i); Shock v. McChesney, 4
Yeates, 5o7 (Pa. i8o8). See also Stephen's Malicious Prosecution, pp. 8
et seq.
NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-BURDEN OF PRooF-In an action
to recover for the death of a person due to injuries received by being struck
by a locomotive, judgment was given for the defendant as the plaintiff failed
to prove that there was no contributory negligence. Sanderson v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 149 N. W. Rep. x88 (Iowa, 1914).
The principal case is in accord with the minority opinion, which is that
the burden rests upon the plaintiff to show freedom from contributory negli-
gence. Railroad Co. v. Ayers, 119 IUl. App. xo8 (i9o5); Axelrod v. Ry. Co,
iog N. Y. App. 87 (19o5). In these jurisdictions requiring the plaintiff to
show the exercise of due care it is nevertheless held that such proof need
not be direct, Hinckley v. Ry. Co., 120 Mass. 257 (1876); but may be in-
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ferred from the circumstances. Chisholm v. State, 145 N. Y. 246 (.895).
Evidence that the injured person was careful on other occasions is not
competent to disprove contributory negligence when he is living, Morris v.
East Haven, 41 Conn. 254 (1874) ; but if he is dead, such evidence is admis-
sible if no eye witness can be found. Railroad Co. v. Bailey, 148 I1. x59
(1893). In these jurisdictions though the burden of proof is upon the
plaintiff, he need not expressly aver in his pleading the. absence of contribu-
tory fault. Fuller v. Ry. Co., 134 Mass. 491 (1883)..
The majority view is that contribatory negligence is a matter of defence,
and that the burden is upon the defendant to prove it. Heiss v. Lancaster,
203 Pa. 260 (1902); Transit Co. v. Behr, 59 N: J. L. 477 (1897). If the
plaintiff's evidence raises a presumption of negligence on his part, the burden
is cast upon him to prove that he- was free froni contributory negligence.
Cahill v. Ry. Co., i8 S. W.-Rep. 2 (Ky. i89i) ; Cummings v. Reduction Co.,
68 Pac. Rep. 852 (Mont. 19o2). Qrdinarily the question of contributory negli-
gence is for the jury, Iron Co. v. Beck, 112 II. Appr. 444 (19o4) ; but where
the plaintiff's own case clearly establishes contributory fault, the matter is
one of law for the court, Roberts v. Telephone Co., 66 S. W. Rep. iss
(Mo. 1902), and a nonsuit may be entered by the court. Schmidt v. St. Louis
Ry., 149 Mo. 269 (1899).
NUISAN cE-PRIATE NUISAcE-STAnLE-A private stable may become a
nuisance by reason of the manner in which it is constructed or maintained.
Kyser v. Hertzler, 65 So. Rep. 967 (Ala. 1914).
While ordinarily a man may do any lawful ac' on his own property, he
will not be allowed to use his own property to the injury of his neighbor.
"Sic ufere tuo ut alienam non laedas." Thus to use property in such a way
as to cause material annoyance, discomfort, or hurt to other persons consti-
tutes a nuisance. Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa. 1x6 (i88o) ; Davis
v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 (1882). The fact that the use is a reasonable one
from the point of view of the property owner is immaterial. Atty. General
v. Cole, i Ch. 205 (Eng. i9o). But a lawful use of one's property, no mat-
ter how offensive or injurious to others, is never a nuisance per re. Canal
Co. v. Columbia Park Co., 99 I1. App. 215 (igoo); Corey v. Edgewood
Borough, i8 Pa. Super. Ct. 216 (19o). Thus it has been held that a private
stable is not a nuisance per se. St. James' Church v. Arrington, 36 Ala. 546
(i86o) ; Keiser v. Lovett, 85 Ind. 24o (1882). But it is equally well estab-
lished that it may become so by reason of the manner in which it is con-
structed, Rounsaville v. Kohlheim, 68 Ga. 668 - (x882); or kept, Rounsaville,
v. Kahlheim, supra; Rodenhausen v. Craven, 141 Pa. -546 (x89i); or used,
Dargan v. Waddill, 31 N. C. 244 (1848); or because of its proximity to the
property of a neighbor, Brewing Co. v. Schmitt, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct. 231 (19o3) ;
Gifford v. Hulett, 62 Vt. 342 (189o). Some courts put the right to recovery
on the basis of the right to pure air which is incident to-the ownership of
land, though this right is not always an absolute one. Romano v. Birmingham
Ry. Co., 62 So. Rep. 677 (1913). But in no case will an injunction be granted
to enjoin the erection of a stable to prevent an anticipated nuisance. Galla-
gher v. Flury, 99 Md. i8x (i9o4) ; St. James' Church v. Arrington, supra.
For a full discussion of this subject see Wood on Nuisances, p. 7o,
§5
PLEADING-RE S JUDICATA-The defence of res judicata is not available
in a suit in equity unless it has been pleaded. Williams v. Williams, xo6 N.
E. Rep. 476 (111. 1914).
At common law a former judgment between the parties, relied upon as
res judicata, could be given in evidence under the general issue in assumpsit,
trover, ejectment, and trespass on the case. Stafford v. Clark, 2 Bing. 377
(Eng. 1824) ;Miller v. Manice, 6 Hill, i15 (N. Y. 1843). A reaction, how-
ever, took place in England in the early part of the nineteenth century,
leading to the establishment of the so-called Hilary rules, Reg. Gen. Hil. T.
4 Win. IV, io Bing. 470 (Eng. 1833), which compelled every matter in dis-
charge of the action to be pleaded specially. This of course included re$
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judicata. In the United States, the recent tendency seems to be in the same
direction. Either by force of statute, or by judicial decision, a large majority
of the late cases prohibit the introduction into evidence of a former judg-
ment unless it has been pleaded. Swamp Land Dist. v. Blumenberg, 156 Cal.
532 (i9o9); Chattanooga Brwg. Co. v. Smith, 3 Ala. App. 565 (1912); Pres-
byterian Church v. Trustees, 2:1 N. Y. 214 (914); Williams v. Hutton, etc.,
Co., 8o S. E. Rep. 257 (N. C. 1913). This is so even in assumpsit, Pye v.
Wyatt. iSI S. W. Rep. xo86 (Tex. 1912); in ejectment, Feldmeyer v. Werntz,
119 Md. 285 (912); and in case, McClellan v. Dow'Co., 114 Minn. 418(ig"). The rule in the same in equity. Hitt. v. Coal Co., 139 S. W. Rep.
693 (Tenn. ig"); Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Louisville, i4i Ky. 131 (x9xo).
A few States admit a former adjudication to be shown, either at law or m
equity, wvithout being pleaded. Bruner v. Finley, 211 Pa. 74 (xgos) ; Bell v.
Niles, 6x Fla. 114 (1911); Passaic Match Co. v. Helio Match Co., 70 AtL l~ep?.
466 (N. 3. 1908). Some cases hold, however, that a judgment given In e
dence under the genera! issue, when there was an opportunity to plead it, is
110 conclusive, but only persuasive evidence. Vooght v. Winch, 2 B. & A.
662 (Eng. 1819); Gray v. Pingry, '7 Vt. 419 (1845). Others hold it con-
clusive. Little Bros. v. Barlow, 37 Fla. 232 (1896) ; Walker v. Chase, 53 Me.
258 (1865). If a complaint discloses on its face a prior adjudication, there
may be a demurrer. Shook v. Shook, 145 S. XV. Rep. 699 (Tex. 1912) ; Fern-
man v. Gillespie, 250 III. 369 (ixi). Contra, Adams v. Billingsley, x53 S. W.
Rep. 1105 (Ark. 1913).
PROPE.RY-FIx'uars--TMrOa^av Si~uc~uaE--Co'tractors 'built a tem-
porary wharf on piles to facilitate the constructior. of a sea wall. Held: 'That
the wharf did not become a fixture. Whether a structure is a fixture or not
depends upon the nature of character of the act by which it is erected and
the purpose for which it was intended to be used. Hogan Lumber Co. v.
City of Oakland, x4a Pac. Rep. xo84 (Cal. rx4).
In determining whether or not a chattel has become a fixture, the con-
trolling element is the intention of the person who affixed the chattel-not the
secret intention, but the intention "imph~ed and manifested by his acts". Hope..
well M ills v. Taunton Savings Bank, iso Mass. 5ig (x89o) ; Readfield Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Cyr, 49 At. Rep.. 1047 (Me. xgoI). This intention
is determined from the character of the annexation, Lawton Pressed Brick &
Tile Co. v. Ross Kellar Triple Pressure Brick Machine Co., 124 Pac. Rep. 43
(0kl. 1912) ; from the character of the thing annexed, i. e., the nature and
adaptation of the articles" to the purposes of the land or structure to which it
is annexed, Horn v. Clark Hardware Co., 131 Pac. Rep. 405 (Colo. 1913);
and from the relation of the party making the annexation to the property."
WVebb v. New Haven Theatre Co., 87 Conn. 129 ('9'3). A few cases hold
that the mode annexation is the test. Clark v. Hill, 117 N. C. ii (1895).
The moder view, however, is not to regard this as c:onclusive, but merely
as an indication of the intention. Lansing Iron & Engine Works v. Wilbur,.
fin Mich. 413 (I897). But if the chattel is so annexed that its removal
would materially injure or leave an unfinished gap in the structure, this is a
strong indication of the intention to make the chattel a fixture. Gunderson v.
Kennedy, 104 IIl. App. 117 (19o2). A chattel may be so necessary to the
use of a structure, or of such a heavy and permanent character that it
becomes a fixture without being actually annexed. Hopewell Mills v. Tauni-
ton Savings Bank, s'upra; Monti v. Barnes, L R. (1901), x K. B. 2o5.
SAL~s-B~R.ACH on WAERANT-WAIvE-A stallion, warranted as a
breeder, was sold with the provision that he might be returned within a
certain time, if not as guaranteed. Held: It was competent for the parties
to agree how the purchasers should take advantage of any breach of war-
ranty, and failure to act in accordance with such agreement, by not returning
within the preseribed time, precludes the buyers from relying upon the breach.
of warranty. Hickman v. Richardson, z42 Pac. Rep. 964 (Kan. 1914).
While the general rule is that, in the case of an executed sale of a
specific chattel, there can be no rescission for a mere breach of warranty,
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there is no legal principle which will prevent the parties from making an
agreement, as in the principal case, by which the buyer may return the
criattel and rescind the contract, if the goods are not found to be as war-
ranted. Brown v. Russell & Co., io5 Ind. 46 (1885) ; McCormick Harvesting
Co. v. Knoll, 57 Neb. 79o (1899). The buyer, however, to avail himself of
his right to return the goods, must comply strictly with the stipulations of
the contract as to time and manner of rescission, and failure to do so may
result in a loss not onily to the right to rescind, but also of an action for
breach of warranty. Gray v. Ice Machine Co., io3 Ga. ii5 (1897); Nichols
Co. v. Caldwell, 20 Ky. Law. Rep. 13.6 (1904) ; Sturtevant Co. v. Kingsland
Co., 74 N. J. L. 492 (igo6). Where thi -provisions for the return are general,
and literal compliance with them under the circumstances is unreasonable or
impossible without committing a trespass or breach of the peace, an exception
to the general rule is recognized and strict perfoimance on the part of the
buyer is not required. Case Machine Co. v. Huber, z6o Mich. 92 (lg9O).
The general rule, as stated above, where there is no collateral agreement,
is that there can be no rescission of an executed sale for breach of war-
ranty, but only an action for damages. Trumbull v. O'Hara, 71 Conn. 172
(i898) ; Kase v. John, io Watts, 107 (Pa. 184o). In some few states, how-
ever, there may be a rescission for a breach of warranty, if it be sought
within a reasonable time, and the other party be restored to status quo.
Hodge v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 366 (1896) ; Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178 (1893).
SALES-CASH SALE-FALURE To RCEcEv CASH ON DEnvERY OF GOODS-
The contract of sale provided for cash on delivery, but though the purchaser
failed to pay, the goods were delivered. The seller did not attempt to
reclaim the goods until after the lapse of six months. Held: Title has passed
to the vendee, and the vendor cannot maintain his action of replevin to
recover the goods. Lehman v. People's Furniture Co., 142 Pac. Rep. 986
(Okla. 1914).
It is well recognized that, in cash sales, title passes to the buyer, unless
reclamation of the property be made promptly after delivery. Blackentoss
v. Speicher, 31 Pa. 324 (1858) ; Freeport Stone Co. v. Carey's Adm'r, 42 V.
Va. 276 (1896) ; Victor Co. v. Texas State Trust Co., 99 S. W. Rep. 1049
(Tex. 1907). In Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141 (1907), the principal authority
relied upon by tile Oklahoma court, it was said, inter alia, "The seller can-
not continue to hold his right to the goods, and at the same time hold the
buyer as his creditor. Continued acquiescence in the buyer's possession of
the goods will be taken as a choice on his part to regard the delivery as
absolute, notwithstanding the buyer's default." Accord, Dupont Co. v. Shields
Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 305 (909).
The courts are not in complete agreement as to the effect of mere de-
livery in cases of cash sales. Most of the decisions hold that while delivery
is some evidence of a waiver, it may be explained by the surrounding cir-
cumstances, and that the question of waiver is for the determination of the
jury. Peabody v. Maguire, 79 Me. 572 (1887); Adams v. Lumber Co., 159
N. Y. 176 (i899). The courts more readily infer a waiver when the rights
of innocent purchasers have intervened. Leatherbury v. Connor, 54 N. J. L
172 (i89i). For a further discussion of the subject of waiver, see Willis-
ton's Sales, §346 (ed. x9o9), and 9 Mich. L R. 239.
SEwucnoN-WHo ENTiTLED To SuE-A girl of twenty-two was seduced.
She was the adopted daughter of a man and his wife, and -performed the
-domestic duties of their household, though under no express contract of
service. The wife sued for damages caused by the seduction. Held: That
no action lay at the suit of the wife. The action of seduction is based on
the relationship of master and servant and not on that of parent and child.
As there was no express contract of service, the girl must be deemed to have
been in the service of the. husband. Peters v. Jones, Ino Law Times, 937
(Eng. 1914).
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The general rule that the action may be brought by the father or some
other person standing in loco parentis to the woman seduced, is based en-
tirely upon the relation of master and servant. Thus if the daughter lives
with the father as a member of his family, and she performs services for
him, or if he at least has a right to command her services, he can maintain
an action against the seducer. Scarlett v. Norwood, 15 N. C. 284 (i894);
Clark v. Clark, 63 N. J. L i (1899); Mohry v. Hoffman, 86 Pa. 358 (x878).
The relationship of parent and child gives rise to the legal fiction that there
is an implied contract of service only when the child resides with the parent.
The action is maintainable where the daughter is under twenty-one with-
out any proof of actual service; but after that age is passed there must be
proof of actual service. Haggerty v. Finnerty (x9o5), 2 I. R. 552; Kennedy
v. Shea, io Mass. 147 (1872); Snider v. Newell, 132 N. C. 614 (19o3). A
mother cannot bring the action during the lifetime of the father. Patterson
v. Thompson, 24 Ark. 55 (1896) ; Logan v. Murray, 6 S. & R. 175 (Pa. z820) ;
but she may if the seduction occurred after his death. Abraham v. Kidney,
104 Mass. 226 (1868) ; Anderson v. Rigg, 64 N. J. L 4o7 (xgoo), or if the
husband resides out of the state. Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N. C. 99 (i898).
In Pennsylvania the mother can maintain the action only by proving actual
service at the time of seduction. Dunlop v. Linton, z44 Pa. 335 (18!o);
Femsler v. Moyer, 3 W. & S. 416 (Pa. 1842). As a bastard has, in the eye
of the law, no father, the mother as the only parent, has the right of action
for the seduction. Hobson v. Fullerton, 4 I1. App. 282 (1879); Muckle-
roy v. Bunham, x U. C. Q. B. 351 (Canada, 1894). The husband may sue
if he adopts the illegitimate daughter of his wife. Bracy v. Kible, 3 Barb.
273 (N. Y. x857).
The right of action is not strictly confined to the natural parents of the
woman seduced, but may be sustained by a person who stands in loco parentis
to her. Thus the action may be brought by the woman's guardian. Case v.
Smith, 107 Mich. 416 (1896); Blanchard v. Ilsley, 12o Mass. 487 (1876); by
her brother, Paterson v. Wilcox, 20 U. C. C. P. 385 (Canada, igoo); by her
brother-in-law, Wilson v. Sproul, 3 Pr. W. 49 (Pa. 184o) ; by her grandfather,
Cestwell v. Hoyt, 6 Hun, 575 (N. Y. 1876) ; by her aunt or uncle, Emery v.
Gowen, 4 Me. 33 (1844); Abernethy v. McPherson, 26 U. C. C. P. 516
(Canada, 1903) ; by her cousin, Davidson v. Goodall, i8 N. H. 423 (z846);
by her stepfather, Kinney v. Langhenour, 89 N. C. 365 (188o); Bartley v.
Richtmeyer, 4 N. Y. 38 (i85o); by her father by adoption, Irvin v. Dearman,
ii East, 23 (Eng. i8io); Nickells v. Goulding, 2I U. C. Q. B. 366 (Canada,
igoi) ; subject of course to the same restrictions and requirements as would
obtain were the action brought by the father of the seduced. The woman
herself is not entitled to maintain any action for her own seduction unless
it is so provided by statute, Heap v. Dunham, 95 11. 583 (i88o); Weaver v.
Bachert, 2 Pa. 8o (1845).
The basis of the action being the loss by the master of the services of
his servant, it is true that, even independently of any blood relationship or
family connection, the master of the woman seduced has a right of action
for her seduction if he has been deprived of her services in consequence
thereof. Ball v. Bruce, 21 IlL 6i (i859); Howland v. Howland, 114 Mass.
5T7 (1872); Graham v. Wallace, 50 N. Y. App. Div. ior (888). Thus the
principal case is in accord with the general law.
ScnooLs-DsMI AL op TEAcHER-WHAT IS NEG.cr OF DuTr-A State
charter forbid the removal of public school teachers except "for gross mis-
conduct, insubordination, neglect of duty or general inefficiency." A mar-
ried teacher absented herself from duty for three months* for the purpose
of bearing a child. A by-law of the board of education provided that the
absence of a teacher is excusable in case of serious personal illness. Held:
Her absence was such a neglect of duty as authorized her dismissal and that
mandamus would not lie to compel her reinstatement. People v. Board of
Education, io6 N. E. Rep. 307 (N. Y. 1914).
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Mandamus is the proper remedy to restore a teacher in the public school
to a right given by express law. from which she is unlawfully precluded.
Kennedy v. Board of Education, 82 Cal. 483 (189o). But the general rule
is that mandamus will not lie to review the determination of public boards
or offiiers in involving the exercise of discretions or judgment, if they have
.proceeded within their jurisdiction and in substantial compliance with the law.
Peolile v. -State Racing Committee, i9o N. Y. 31 (19o7). To that rule,
however, there is the well recognized exception that the action of the officer
must nor be capricious or arbitrary, and if such be the character of the reason
for refusing to act the writ will lie. Illinois State Board of Dental Exam-
iners v. People, 123 Ill. 227 (1887), and the fact that another teacher has
been placed in the position from which the teacher had been dismissed does
not affect her right to maintain the action. Kennedy v. Board of Education,
ups'ra.
A short dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Chief Justice Bartlett, in
which he took the view that the absence for the purpose of bearing a child
did not constitute neglect of duty and therefore the board of education was
without power or jurisdiction to remove the teacher. It is not easy to
understand on what theory to support the conclusion reached by the majority
of the court in the principal case. It would seem that the soundness of
the decision may well be doubted as maternity, requiring occasional absences
at periods of childbirth, is a natural consequence of the employment of
potential mothers as teachers.
SPEcIFIc PEgrORM ANC -CONSIDERATi.--ADEQUAcY-The plaintiff, at
the request of his mother, the defendant, consented to continue to assist in
maintaining their household, in consideration of the latter's oral agreement to
convey to him a tract of land, worth at least $6oo0, for which it was stipu-
lated that he was to give a mortgage thereon for $2ooo with five per cent.
interest payable annually during the life of the defendant, who was then
sixty-five years old. The plaintiff had the option of paying the principal at
any time, but the mortgage was to be void after the defendant's death. The
plaintiff occupied the land, used manure thereon worth $300, constructed an
artesian well, and made repairs worth more than $2oo. Held: Even if the
defendant has the right to demand payment of $2000, this sum is so much
below the real value of the land that the transaction is substantially a gift,
the annual payment of interest being presumably satisfied out of the rents and"
profits. Specific performance refused. Reich v. Reich, 91 AfU. Rep. 899
(N. J. 1914).
The rule of the weight of authority is that mere inadequacy of considera-
tion is not alone a sufficient ground for refusing specific performance, unless
the inadequacy is "such as shocks the conscience and amounts in itself to
conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud." Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 234
(Eng. i84); Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 263 (U. S. 1831); contra, by
statute, Fleishman v. Woods, 135 Cal. 256 (i9oi). According to the early
view in England aid the United States, inadequacy of consideration was a
particular instance of unfairness or hardship and was therefore a basis for
refusal of specific performance, irrespective of fraud. Day v. Newman, 2
Cox. 77 (Eng. 1788); Dodd v. Seymour, 21 Conn. 476 (1852). Inadequacy
determined as of the time when the contract was made is an ingredient, which
when associated with other inequitable incidents, will contribute to prevent
specific performance. Lee v. Kirby, 104 Mass. 420 (1870). In order to obtain
specific performance, there must be a valuable consideration such as is neces-
sary to support a contract at law. Stubbings v. Durham, 20 IIl. 542 (I9O4) ;
Boles v. Caudle, i33 N. C. 5a8 (x9o3). A promise for a promise is suffi-
cient. Perry v. Stephens, 66 N. Y. 32I (18-6); contra, Winter v. Goelner, 2
Colo. App. 259 (1892). An agreement to convey a right of way was specifi-
cally enforced, although the consideration was only a dollar. Ala. C. R. Co. v.
Long, 158 Ala. 3oi (i9o8). Most courts, however, hold that a dollar is merely
a nominal and not a valuable consideration. Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482
(i9o8); Berry v. Frisbie, i2o Ky. 337 (19o5). Equity will not enforce an
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agreement to pay a certain sum, in consideration of the payment of a smaller
sum. Richardson v. Barrick. 16 Ia. 407 (1864). Specific performance of a
contract to convey in consideration of $I3.OOO one-fifth of all the property
which might he acquired at any future time was refused, although the defend-
ant had nothing at the time of the making of the contract but subsequently
acquired $750.oo0. Marks v. Gates, 83 C. C. A. 32T (i9o7). As in the prin-
cipal case, the nominal character of the consideration may, in connection
with other facts, tend to show that the transaction was not a sale but an
incomplete gift which is of course unenforceable. Callaghan v. Callaghan,
8 Cl. & Fin. 374 (Eng. 384i). Thus, an agreement to convey a plantation
"in consideration of payment" from the profits thereof has been held to lack
consideration and to be merely a gift. Dorsey v. Packwood, 53 U. S. 126
(08si).
T:LEr.RAPH COMPANIES---]LIV3RY OF FORGED TELEGRAM-LABILITY TO
ADDRESSF.-A bank was allowed to recover in a tort action the damages suf-
fered in consequence of the delivery of forged telegrams. State Bank of
Commerce of Clayton v. W. U. Tel. Co., 142 Pac. Rep. xs6 (New Mex.
1914).
This case is accord with the general rule that a prima fade case is
established by proof of damages proximately caused by reliance upon a mes-
sage, delivered by a telegraph company, purporting to come from but not in
fact sent by a person in whose name it is signed. However, since a tele-
graph company is not an insurer of the accuracy of a message, there can
be no recovery if it prove that reasonable care has been exercised in the
receipt and transmission of the telegram. Wells v. NV. U. Tel. Co., 144
Ia. 605 (igog) ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Uvalde, 97 Tex. 219 (1904). In the latter
case, a forged message was sent by wire-tappers and the telegraph company
was held liable for failure to safeguard against such interference. A fortiori,
where a telegraph operator, employed by the company, is the author of the
forged telegram, the latter is liable. Magourick v. W. U. Tel. Co-, 79 Miss.
632 (1902).
Ordinarily, there is no obligation upon a telegraph company to investi-
gate the identity of the sender of a message.. But where there are circum-
stances which would ordinarily arouse suspicion of impersonation or want
of authority, there is a duty to communicate the suspicious facts to the ad-
dressee. Elwood v. W. U. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 549 (I87x). It has been held
that if a person fraudulently using the name of another, sends a telegram
requesting money to a person, who, in response to the request, sends money
by telegraph, the addressee cannot recover from the company, if there were
no circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of an -ordinarily
careful man. W. U. Tel. Co. v. Meyer, 61 Ala. 1,8 (1878).
TrtOVER AND CoNvaiS -oN-MEAsuRE OF DAMAGES-In the absence of special
circumstances, the measure of damages for conversion is the value of the
property at the time of the conversion plus interest, with no compensation
for the use or hire of the property. Martinez v. Vigil, 142 Pac. Rep. 920
(N. Mex. 1914).
In an action of trover for the conversion of personal property where the
goods are not returned to the rightful owner, the measure of damages is as
stated in the principal case. This is the English rule and is followed every-
where in the United States. Watson v. McLean, r E. B. and E. 75 (Eng.
1858); Beecher v. Denniston, 13 Gray, 354 (Mass. 1859); Perrin v. Wells,
r55 Pa. 299 (1893); Texarkana Water Co. v. Kizer, 63 S. W. Rep. 913
(Tex. igoi). So also if the conversion of part of an article renders the rest
worthless for all purposes, the value of the whole may be recovered. Walker
v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 147 (1881). This is based on the theory that a con-
version consists of a wrongful transfer of title at a certain definite time.
Backentoss v. Stabler, 33 Pa. 251 (1859). Ordinarily the plaintiff can not
recover the value of the use or hire, because he is suing for the value of the
goods when taken from his possession, as though it were a case of a forced
sale. Cutler v. Goold Co., 43 Hun, 516 (N. Y. x887); Texarkana Water
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Co. v. Kizer, spra; -Ewing v. Blount. 2o Ala. 694 (1852); Hill v. Canfield,
56 Pa. 454 (1867) ; Govin v. de Miranda, 14o N. Y. 474 (1893). The theory
is that the value of the goods at the time of the conversion with interest
is the value of the goods themselves. Sutherland on Damages (3rd ed.),
vol. 4, §1x39; Sedgwick'on Damages (9th ed.), vol. 2, §493a. But where the.goods are restored to the'rightful owner, the measure- of damages is a rea-
sonable compensafion for the'use of the property. The plaintiff is then
considered as the owner of property suing for the loss occasioned by the
wrongful deprivation of its us-. Ewing v. Blount, supra; Shotwell v. Wend-
over, r Johns. Sup...Ct. Reps. 64 (N. Y. i8o6). Damages for deterioration are
also allowed. Shotwell v. Wendover, supr-. Statutes .in some states have
greatly broadened the field of the general rules. Pridgin v. Strickland, 8
Tex. 427 (1852); Martin v. Oslin, 94 Ga. 658 (1894); Hawkins v. Kansas
City Co., 63 Mo. App. 64 (r895).
TRUSTS - TERMINATION- PURPOSE ACcOMPLISHED - A parent, whose
daughter had married a dissipated man, devised property in trust for her
use during the life of her husband, and upon his death to be turned over
to her absolutely. The daughter procured a divorce. Held: The trust was
terminated; for the divorce effectually accomplisbed the purpose of the tes-
tator. In re Cornil's Estate, 149 N. W. Rep. 65 (Iowa, 1914).
It is well established that equity will terminate a trust if the object for
which it was created has ceased to exist. Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145 (1874),
even if the time for the termination fixed by the testator has not arrived.
Wayman v. Follansbee, 253 Ill. 6o2 (1912). The courts have uniformly held,
under the facts of the principal case, that the sole object of the trust was
to protect the property from the husband, and that the divorce of the parties
achieved this object as completely as the death of the husband would have
done. Koenig's Appeal, 57 Pa. 352 (1868); Rittenhouse v. Hicks, io Ohio
Dec. 759 (i8go). The authorities do not seriously consider the possibility
that the testator's purpose may be defeated-by the remarriage of the divorced
parties. Carey v. Slead, 220 Ill. 5o8 (19o6), where the court said, inter atla,
"We do not feel at liberty to assume that an event so improbable will occur
or that a possibility of that kind would be a sufficient ground for giving a
different construction to the will." s-The courts likewise find no difficulty in
awarding the property to the beneficiary, although her children have a con-
tingent interest under the will. In re Lee's Estate, 207 Pa. 218 (19o3).
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CONVEYANCE TO THIRD PARTY SuBjECr TO
OrTioN-When an option to purchase any real property has been given, the
owner of the premises has an estate therein which he can transfer, and the
party accepting the title, if he has notice or knowledge of the privilege con-
ferred by the option, necessarily takes the premises curn onere. Fargo v.
Wade, 142 Pac. Rep. 830 (Or. 1914).
In accordance with the principal case, the subsequent conveyance of the
land by the optioner does not revoke the option, but the grantee having
knowledge of the option, takes the land subject to the equitable estate already
vested in the optionee. Cummins v. Beavers, 1o3 Va. 230 (19o4). The
optioner "does not sell his lands; he does not agree to sell it, but he does
then sell something, viz., the right, or privilege to buy at the election or
option, of the other party ... The owner parts with his right to sell
his lands (except to the second party) for a limited period." Ide v. Lieser,
io Mont. 5 (i8go). Unlimited restrictions upon the right of alienation have
been considered as against the general policy of the law, and the language
of the dicta in the case quoted. "The owner parts with his right to sell the
lands (except to the second party) for a limited period" should not be con-
strued to mean that there could not be a disposition of the owner's rights
in the property subject to the option contract. Elliot v. Delaney, 217 Mo. 14
(igog). Similarly, death of the vendor does not vitiate the option contract
and the optionee is entitled to specific performance of the contract against
the decedent't heirs. Mueller v. Nortman, i6 Wis. 468 (igo3).
